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17 08:15:37		For the State of California
08:15:37 18		*** PROCEEDINGS ***
08:15:37 08:22:02 19		*** PROCEEDINGS ***
08:22:39 20		DEPUTY CLERK: All rise. Now, in the United
08:36:41 21	States Distr	ict Court for the District of Delaware, the
08:36:45 22	Honorable Co	lm F. Connolly presiding.
08:36:47 23		THE COURT: All right. Good morning. Please be
08:36:49 24	seated.	
08:36:55 25		Who do we have? Oh, good morning.

08:36:59 1 MR. REMMING: Good morning, Your Honor. For the 08:37:00 2 record, Andrew Remming from Morris Nichols for the Venoco Trust. I'm joined at counsel's table today by my colleagues 08:37:05 3 from the Bracewell firm, Warren Harris, Nancy Davis and 08:37:07 4 Stephani Michel. Mr. Harris will handle the presentation 08:37:11 5 today for the trust. 08:37:14 6 08:37:14 7 THE COURT: Okay. Great. 08:37:17 8 MR. REMMING: Thank you. 08:37:18 9 MR. FOURNIER: Good morning, Your Honor. David 08:37:25 10 Fournier from Troutman Pepper on behalf of California State Lands Commission. I'm joined here by my colleagues from the 08:37:31 11 08:37:33 12 Loeb & Loeb firm, Steven Rosenthal, Alicia Clough and Marc 08:37:38 13 Cohen. Mr. Rosenthal will handle the presentation for the Lands Commission. 08:37:42 14 08:37:43 15 THE COURT: Okay. Great. Thank you. 08:37:45 16 All right. 08:37:47 17 MR. BLACK: Your Honor, Deputy Attorney General 08:37:54 18 Edward K. Black appearing as local counsel for the State of 08:37:58 19 California. With me is Deputy Attorney General Mitchell Rishe from the State of California as lead counsel. We cede 08:38:00 20 08:38:03 21 our time for presentation to the State Lands Commission. 08:38:08 22 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 08:38:1223 Good morning. 08:38:12 24 MR. HARRIS: May it please the Court, my name is

Warren Harris. I'll present two points today.

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First, there's no emergency because there was no imminent threat to the public's health and safety, and any alleged emergency was foreseeable.

And, second, because ExxonMobil is liable for the cost of plugging and abandoning the wells, there was a reasonable alternative to Defendant's taking of the EOF.

The Bankruptcy Court ignored that an emergency justifying the police powers exception must be imminent and unforeseeable. Courts have limited the circumstances permitting Government to bypass the just compensation requirement for the takings of private property. These limitations are limited to circumstances that involve emergencies in the traditional sense such as natural disasters, like fires and floods, wars, and political activity — or police activity to combat crime.

These narrow circumstances involving emergencies have two things in common. First, they involve imminent peril; and, second, they involve unforeseeable circumstances.

The Bankruptcy Court held that an emergency justified a non-compensable taking. First, the Bankruptcy Court found that an emergency existed when Venoco allegedly threatened to leave the EOF unmanned.

And, second, the Bankruptcy Court found that an emergency would exist indefinitely until the wells were

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permanently plugged and abandoned, but the Bankruptcy
Court's holding was erroneous because the alleged emergency
was neither imminent nor unforeseeable.

THE COURT: Is it a totally factual determination or a legal determination that you take issue with?

MR. HARRIS: It's primarily a legal determination. We've only challenged one finding as being clearly erroneous. The rest were legal determinations.

THE COURT: Okay. And then what is the one fact that you have said is fact or the one fact finding that in your mind constitutes a clear error?

MR. HARRIS: The Bankruptcy Court's finding that there was no choice but for the Commission to step in and take over, and that goes to the alternative holding of the Bankruptcy Court as well as affects the unforeseeability element of the Bankruptcy Court.

THE COURT: All right. So, just so I'm clear, it's the holding that -- well, I'd like you to, again, maybe just restate it or -- just so I know in my mind what is the factual finding that you say was clearly erroneous. If you had to write it down and give it to me, you would.

MR. HARRIS: That the Commission had no choice but to step in and take over. And that's on Page 1497.

THE COURT: Hold on. Had no choice but to...

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08:40:49 1	MR. HARRIS: Step in and take over the plugging
08:40:52 2	and abandoning
08:40:53 3	THE COURT: Now, just so we're clear, the
08:40:55 4	Commission is not stepping in and taking over. They're
08:40:58 5	getting third parties effectively to do that; right?
08:41:01 6	MR. HARRIS: Correct. Beacon West was the
08:41:03 7	contractor they hired.
08:41:04 8	THE COURT: Right. Okay. So, they had no
08:41:06 9	choice but to get a third party
08:41:09 10	MR. HARRIS: Right.
08:41:09 11	THE COURT: to step in.
08:41:11 12	All right. And just, also, can you step back
08:41:13 13	and help me out? I just kind of want to get a little it
08:41:15 14	may not be relevant, but am I right that is it Wracher
08:41:20 15	how do you pronounce it the person, the COO or the former
08:41:23 16	COO whose emails go
08:41:26 17	MR. HARRIS: Yes. I can't remember his name,
08:41:27 18	but let me Wracher.
08:41:32 19	THE COURT: Wracher?
08:41:32 20	MR. HARRIS: Yes.
08:41:33 21	THE COURT: But it's W-R-A-C-H-E-R or something
08:41:35 22	like that?
08:41:36 23	MR. HARRIS: Yeah.
08:41:36 24	THE COURT: Okay. So, Wracher is the COO of
08:41:40 25	Venoco; is that right?

08:41:41 1	MR. HARRIS: Yes.
08:41:42 2	THE COURT: Okay. And he's the one whose emails
08:41:46 3	are relied upon by the State and the Commission to say,
08:41:51 4	We've got an imminent threat; right?
08:41:53 5	MR. HARRIS: Primarily, yes.
08:41:54 6	THE COURT: He's also, as I understand it, part
08:41:55 7	of Beacon West.
08:41:57 8	MR. HARRIS: Beacon West
08:41:58 9	THE COURT: Is that right?
08:41:59 10	MR. HARRIS: I believe that's right. Beacon
08:42:01 11	West, as I understand, was formed by former Venoco
08:42:03 12	employees.
08:42:04 13	THE COURT: Including Wracher.
08:42:06 14	MR. HARRIS: I believe that's right.
08:42:17 15	THE COURT: I am not saying I can articulate it,
08:42:24 16	but there's something about that that strikes me as odd or
08:42:28 17	worthy of further inquiry. Can you help me maybe explore
08:42:32 18	that?
08:42:32 19	MR. HARRIS: As I understand, whenever they
08:42:35 20	needed someone to come in and take over the facility, they
08:42:38 21	were looking for people that had experience on that
08:42:42 22	facility. Venoco was no longer able to employ the workers
08:42:46 23	that were there, and they that's why they formed a
08:42:49 24	separate company called Beacon West. And it was that
08:42:51 25	company that was hired by the Commission. That's my

08:42:54 1 understanding.

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THE COURT: Okay. Now, am I oversimplifying things too much to say, so Wracher is basically saying, Hey, we're going to shut down come April, what is it, 25th? I forget what date it was.

MR. HARRIS: There are different dates in the record. One's April 25th, I think, and one is April 30th.

THE COURT: And it's like -- so, we're out of here April 25th.

Now, as a practical matter, if Wracher had walked off the job April 25th, and all of his colleagues, and left that plant vacant and $\rm H_2S$ leaked and killed people, isn't he going to be prosecuted criminally for some kind of crime?

MR. HARRIS: I'm not that familiar with

California law on that, but I would suspect there's a very

good chance that that would happen. It seems to me that

would be a violation of most state laws.

THE COURT: All right. Anyway, sorry. I interrupted your flow. Go ahead.

MR. HARRIS: California and federal law require an emergency to be imminent to trigger the application of police powers exception, and the case law is very explicit about this. California law requires an imminent and substantial threat to public health or safety, and federal

law, likewise, requires imminent peril. And to constitute
an imminent peril, a situation must call for immediate
action.

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There could be no imminent threat to the public's health or safety once the State's contractor assumed operations of the EOF in September 2017.

THE COURT: Can you read that again?

MR. HARRIS: There can be no imminent threat to the public's health or safety once the State's contractor assumed operations of the EOF in September 2017.

What the Bankruptcy Court found was the emergency arose when Venoco allegedly threatened, as we talked about a minute ago, to leave the EOF unmanned. And that finding was based on an alleged immediate need to keep the EOF up and running to protect the public from hydrogen sulfide.

But the Commission didn't assert its police powers then. If that had been a situation where the police powers were triggered, it would have taken the EOF. What the Commission did instead was to go find funding, which shows that the Commission knew that at that time it couldn't use its police power to take the EOF without compensation.

THE COURT: So, let me just step back, though. So, are you saying that if in April of 2017, the Commission gets this email hypothetically, right, and it says, We're

08:45:39 1 going -- we, Venoco --08:45:41 2 MR. HARRIS: Right. THE COURT: -- are leaving unmanned the EOF come 08:45:41 3 April 25th, are you saying that if the Commission and the 08:45:44 4 State had not gone and sought funding and, instead, had 08:45:48 5 brought in its own engineers, some third party, and on 08:45:57 6 08:46:03 7 April 25th walked into the plant, took it over, that actually would have been a lawful taking? 08:46:10 8 08:46:12 9 Is that what you're saying? 08:46:13 10 MR. HARRIS: What I'm saying is that the Commission at that time knew that if -- they knew this was 08:46:16 11 08:46:19 12 all coming. They knew --THE COURT: Well, they didn't -- let's say -- I 08:46:20 13 think the email is, you know, probably dated April 17th or 08:46:22 14 08:46:25 15 something. That's my recollection. 08:46:26 16 Does anybody know? I'm looking at the 08:46:30 17 associates or the younger partners. 08:46:30 18 MS. DAVIS: It's dated April 12th. 08:46:31 19 THE COURT: April 12th. Thank you. 08:46:33 20 All right. So, you know, they get this -- the 08:46:35 21 Commission gets an email April 12th. And if you had an 08:46:43 22 email April 12th that said, We're leaving unmanned the plant 08:46:47 23 on April 25th --08:46:50 24 MR. HARRIS: Mm-hmm. THE COURT: -- would you dispute that that's 08:46:51 25

imminent? 08:46:54 1 08:46:56 2 MR. HARRIS: I think that would be imminent. THE COURT: Okay. So, let's stop then. 08:46:56 3 So, then we've got an imminent threat on 08:46:58 4 April 12th that the plant is going to go unmanned on 08:47:02 5 April 25th. And you would agree, right, that the unmanned 08:47:04 6 08:47:07 7 plant is a danger? You have to agree with that; right? MR. HARRIS: Yes, Your Honor. 08:47:10 8 08:47:11 9 THE COURT: Okay. So, now the State -- and I'm 08:47:13 10 going to put the State and the Commission together. Let's just call it the State. 08:47:15 11 08:47:17 12 MR. HARRIS: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. They've got 13 days to do 08:47:17 13 something, right. And if they went out and they hired a 08:47:20 14 08:47:24 15 third party, all right, let's just call it a third party, to 08:47:28 16 come in on April 25th to take over the plant, would that be 08:47:33 17 a lawful taking? 08:47:35 18 MR. HARRIS: If nothing else had prevented -- if 08:47:39 19 nothing else had interceded to take the imminence away. And 08:47:43 20 here, for example, on April 14th, the Commission of Venoco 08:47:47 21 entered into the Reimbursement Agreement. So --08:47:49 22 THE COURT: I got that. 08:47:49 23 MR. HARRIS: -- there was already an agreement 08:47:51 24 in place. THE COURT: Right. But it's almost like you're 08:47:52 25

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punishing the State because they decided to come up with something of a compromise, if you will. Because it sounds like what you're saying is, Look, if they wanted to, they could have gone out between April 12th and April 25th, and hired a third party and or manned it with some State employees. Let's just -- maybe we don't have any other third party. And they could have come in on April 25th and taken it over, no problem, without compensation.

That's what you're saying?

MR. HARRIS: No, Your Honor. Remember here that Venoco never locked -- no one ever locked the State out of the EOF. The EOF had always been available. It was simply a matter of whether it was being manned. So, that's really what the focus is that --

THE COURT: Yeah, but, I mean, if you're the State and the company says, We're out of here April 25th, we're out, we're done. I mean, at that point, let's say, and -- doesn't the State -- I mean, it's responsible for going out and accounting for what would happen if, in fact, on April 25th there's nobody at that plant.

MR. HARRIS: And what the State went to do was to hire people to come in. And the Reimbursement Agreement was put in place, which took the urgency off of that.

And then by September, they had a contract with Beacon West. And that was the emergency that was found by

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08:49:17 1	the Bankruptcy Court. That was the imminent threat. The
08:49:20 2	imminence had ceased once they had a contractor in place
08:49:24 3	that was going to be manning the facility, because it wasn't
08:49:27 4	dealing with access to the facility
08:49:29 5	THE COURT: So, is it your position that there
08:49:31 6	was an imminent threat between April and September?
08:49:34 7	MR. ROSENTHAL: We don't
08:49:34 8	THE COURT: Because they signed the contract
08:49:35 9	with Beacon West in September; right?
08:49:37 10	MR. HARRIS: Correct.
08:49:37 11	THE COURT: Okay. So, is it your position that
08:49:39 12	those four to five months, there was an imminent threat?
08:49:43 13	MR. HARRIS: No, Your Honor. I guess two points
08:49:45 14	on that.
08:49:46 15	First, the Reimbursement Agreement was signed on
08:49:49 16	April 14th, so I believe that would be sufficient to stop
08:49:52 17	the imminent threat.
08:49:53 18	Then, we have the Beacon West agreement, which
08:49:56 19	was put in place in September. We disagree with the
08:50:00 20	Bankruptcy Court's finding. We're not challenging that
08:50:02 21	finding. Even assuming
08:50:04 22	THE COURT: Wait, wait. Hold on. So, you've
08:50:0623	got to be clear on that then.
08:50:07 24	MR. HARRIS: Yes.

THE COURT: So, what finding are you -- if

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you're disagreeing, then you are saying it's erroneous?

MR. HARRIS: We have not challenged it as

clearly erroneous.

THE COURT: Okav. I see.

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MR. HARRIS: But even assuming the Bankruptcy Court is right on there being an imminent threat, it would have been cut off by the Reimbursement Agreement or at the very latest, it would have been cut off in September 2017, whenever Beacon West was hired.

So, at that point there is no more imminent threat. The imminent threat found by the Bankruptcy Court is we think Venoco may leave the facility unmanned. The Reimbursement Agreement really took care of that a few days later.

Then in September, the State hires Beacon West.

They have a contract for -- in place. Any threat of the EOF being unmanned is gone at that point. And so, even assuming that the Bankruptcy Court was right and there was an imminent threat, those two factors -- and certainly by September 17th, when they had their contractor in, there was no longer an imminent threat, and the emergency ceased to exist at that point.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARRIS: And it was only -- it was only after the parties couldn't reach an agreement regarding

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payment for the EOF that the Commission, a year later, declared that it would use its police power and argue that that was retroactive all the way back to April of 2017.

But this was really about a funding issue.

Whenever they went out in April of 2017, it was to get

funding to man the EOF. It wasn't dealing with access to

the facility, because Venoco had never told them they

couldn't have access. Venoco was simply saying, We can't

afford to pay the employees any longer; therefore, we don't

have the ability to man the facility. You need to handle

getting it manned.

The Reimbursement Agreement was signed a few days later. Beacon West was hired in September. At that point, even if there was an imminent threat, it was gone.

And the emergency exception to the requirement to compensate for a taking no longer existed, and they could not take the facility.

Turning now to the plugging and abandoning of the wells. That doesn't have anything to do with the immediate need of keeping the EOF staffed. The Bankruptcy Court held that the emergency that would justify the Commission's use of the EOF without compensation held that that would continue until the plugging and abandoning process was completed. But you have other findings of the Bankruptcy Court that are inconsistent with that.

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THE COURT: Well, wait. Hold on.

So, before you get to what the inconsistent findings are --

MR. HARRIS: Yes.

THE COURT: -- what is the finding -- can you repeat again the finding that you just said is inconsistent with what you're about to say? What's that finding?

MR. HARRIS: "That an emergency would justify the Commission's use of the EOF without compensation until the plugging and abandoning process was complete."

And that's on Page 1486 of the record.

THE COURT: Okay. So, you're now challenging the finding by the Bankruptcy Court that an emergency would justify a continued taking until the plugging and abandonment of the wells was complete; is that right?

MR. HARRIS: That finding is irrelevant to the immediate harm because the immediate harm deals with keeping the EOF manned. And that has to happen regardless of the plugging and abandoning. I mean, what the Bankruptcy Court found was there's an imminent harm that the EOF might not be manned, and that imminent harm is going to continue until the plugging and abandoning process is complete.

And our argument is that the plugging and abandoning process didn't have anything to do with the imminent harm. The Bankruptcy Court found --

08:53:51 1	THE COURT: Well, wait. What you're saying is a
08:53:53 2	factual matter? Are you saying it's
08:53:57 3	MR. HARRIS: Yes, I believe that would be as a
08:54:00 4	factual matter because if you look at the Bankruptcy Court's
08:54:02 5	finding, the finding was the immediate need was to keep
08:54:05 6	the EOF up and running to protect the public from exposure.
08:54:08 7	THE COURT: Right.
08:54:09 8	MR. HARRIS: And it said plugging and abandoning
08:54:12 9	is a separate process. It has nothing to do with the
08:54:14 10	immediate need to keep the EOF up and running to protect
08:54:17 11	against the hydrogen sulfide.
08:54:19 12	THE COURT: So, can you just help me out,
08:54:21 13	though? I need to understand better the facts, I think.
08:54:24 14	If the wells are not plugged, okay, is there
08:54:33 15	production of H_2 S?
08:54:35 16	MR. HARRIS: Yes.
08:54:36 17	THE COURT: Okay. And isn't it true that unless
08:54:38 18	that H_2S is
08:54:44 19	MR. HARRIS: Stopped.
08:54:44 20	THE COURT: Well, I was going to say it's
08:54:4621	transformed into some okay chemical, right, then there is an
08:54:52 22	immediate threat of human sickness; right?
08:54:58 23	MR. HARRIS: There is a threat, but as long as
08:55:01 24	the EOF is manned and that treatment process
08:55:03 25	THE COURT: No, as long as it's manned, but I do

08:55:05 1 think that that's why I wanted to question you on this. 08:55:08 2 thought it was a given that until the wells are plugged, there has to be a facility, via the EOF or creation of some 08:55:15 3 new facility, that mitigates the H₂S that will continue to 08:55:19 4 emanate from the wells until they're plugged. 08:55:24 5 08:55:26 6 Is that not right? 08:55:28 7 MR. HARRIS: That is correct. THE COURT: Okay. So, how could the Bankruptcy 08:55:28 8 08:55:32 9 Court be erroneous in finding that until the wells are 08:55:36 10 plugged, there's an imminent threat of harm? Imminence is a separate question 08:55:42 11 MR. HARRIS: 08:55:44 12 to -- leave that aside for a minute. But the plugging and abandoning process doesn't manage the H,S. It would stop it 08:55:46 13 08:55:51 14 at a point. 08:55:52 15 THE COURT: It would make it unnecessary. 08:55:54 16 MR. HARRIS: It would make it unnecessary because you no longer need to manage the ${\tt H}, {\tt S}$ because there 08:55:55 17 would be no H₂S. 08:55:58 18 08:55:5919 THE COURT: Right. But until the wells are 08:56:03 20 fully plugged, there is an H,S management problem that has to be addressed. Otherwise, there is a harm. 08:56:05 21 08:56:07 22 MR. HARRIS: There is a potential harm, yes. 08:56:0923 THE COURT: Well, potential harm, I mean -- how 08:56:11 24 do you get the harm versus potential harm? I mean, I thought you have to address the H2S issue, be it plug the 08:56:14 25

well or have some facility, the EOF; isn't that right?

MR. HARRIS: That is right.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARRIS: But the point we're making in the Bankruptcy Court, and the Bankruptcy Court found this, that the plugging and abandoning process isn't part of the treatment for the $\rm H_2S$. It simply would stop it. But that --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARRIS: -- that would stop where you no longer have to be there to treat it. But that is different than whether you have the facility manned, which is what the real threat was.

So, it's really -- the imminent threat that the Bankruptcy Court found was the potential that the EOF might be unmanned. And then the secondary part of that was, and that threat will continue until the plugging and abandoning process is completed.

But the threat was leaving it unmanned, not just the hydrogen sulfide. That's the point we're trying to make. And, therefore, the plugging and abandoning really doesn't have anything to do with the alleged emergency, other than the stop — other than the fact that it would eventually stop. That's how you would stop the hydrogen sulfide is through the plugging process.

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08:57:17 1 THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. HARRIS: And so, the point we're making is that the imminent threat was that the EOF might be unmanned. That was resolved in September 2017 when Beacon West entered the facility. The State had a contractor in place. There was no longer a threat because the facility being manned was dealing with the hydrogen sulfide.

And so, the immediacy, which is one of the requirements of an emergency, the immediacy and the imminence of the threat ceased to exist. So, therefore, at that point, there was no longer an emergency.

The Bankruptcy Court also ignored that an emergency justifying the police powers exception has to be unforeseen, and the California cases involving the police powers exception involve unforeseen circumstances.

California law explicitly requires this unforeseen situation to exist before there can be an emergency. The term "emergency" has long been accepted in California as an unforeseen situation calling for immediate action. And a situation is not unforeseen if the Government has prior knowledge of the alleged emergency. Federal Courts, likewise, require that unexpected circumstances exist for there to be an emergency.

The Bankruptcy Court first said there's no such broad rule. There's no requirement that it be unforeseen,

but then found that even if it was -- even if there is a requirement that it be unforeseen, it would be satisfied here.

But contrary to the Bankruptcy Court's narrow finding on this interpretation, foreseeability, the Government doesn't have to know the exact moment and circumstances that a situation will occur to be unforeseeable. At a minimum, if the Government intends to handle the emergency in a certain way and does just that, the situation is foreseeable and can't be an emergency.

Now, let's look at what happened here. The

Commission required Venoco to provide security for the

amount that the Defendants believe was necessary to

compensate the Commission for the cost of plugging and

abandoning the wells if Venoco or another lessee quitclaimed

the leases. The Commission knew that the leases permitted

lessees to unilaterally quitclaim their rights.

THE COURT: Incidentally on that, is there any conditions on the quitclaim? In other words, on the right to quitclaim?

MR. HARRIS: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor.

There may be a requirement that you can no longer pay or not be able to do it. I'd need to look at the lease itself to see if there's a condition. I'm not aware of a condition on the ability to quitclaim. But if you had a commercially

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producing well, you wouldn't want to give it back to the State. That would be negating the value of your lease.

It's a situation like here where the --

THE COURT: Well, let me give you an example.

So, I've got some well. I'm making money off it. Put aside the EOF issue. And all of a sudden, I hit something in the well. I don't know, it's a dangerous chemical. All right.

And all of a sudden, it is coming out of the pipe.

Are you saying at that point, the lessee could just quitclaim it to the State and say, By the way, we're walking away. It's on you now to take care of this well.

MR. HARRIS: I would have to double-check the lease. I'm not aware of a condition that would prevent that. I believe that a lessee could quitclaim the well back to the State under that circumstance.

THE COURT: Without plugging the well?

MR. HARRIS: Without plugging, but the State knows that this is a potentiality.

THE COURT: Right. So, it gets a bond.

MR. HARRIS: It gets a bond. And here it not only got a bond, it checked the bond periodically. Whenever Venoco filed for bankruptcy in 2016, it increased the amount of the bond. It increased the bond up to \$22 million, which is the amount that the Commission determined was -- should be sufficient for plugging and abandoning the wells and

09:01:30 1 decommissioning Platform Holly. 09:01:32 2 THE COURT: And on that you say something in your briefs about -- what I inferred from the brief was that 09:01:33 3 the State's only spent 25 million, that there's only a \$3 09:01:40 4 million gap; is that right? 09:01:45 5 MR. HARRIS: That's what I understand. The bond 09:01:45 6 09:01:47 7 was 22 million. The entire amount of the bond has been paid. The State in its brief said that they spent 25 09:01:50 8 09:01:53 9 million. So, yes, \$22 million of that was paid out of the 09:01:56 10 bond. And the bond --09:01:58 11 THE COURT: So, are you saying the State's been 09:02:00 12 made whole so far? 09:02:01 13 MR. HARRIS: Twenty-two of the --09:02:02 14 THE COURT: I mean, except for the 3 million 09:02:04 15 bucks. 09:02:04 16 MR. HARRIS: Yes, Your Honor, we are. And 09:02:06 17 whenever they set the bond, they specifically considered the 09:02:08 18 cost of plugging, abandoning and decommissioning the wells 09:02:12 19 and Platform Holly. And that's clearly stated in the 09:02:15 20 record. 09:02:15 21 It's also in the record that they didn't include 09:02:18 22 costs for the EOF. Now, the State knew to do the 09:02:25 23 decommissioning, to do the plugging and abandoning, it would 09:02:27 24 need to use the EOF. It knew it didn't have any ownership

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rights in the EOF. It knew it didn't have a lease or other

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contractual right to use the EOF, but it didn't put it in the bond. It even -- in the record, Ms. Lucchesi testified, "In hindsight, we did not negotiate a bond high enough."

That's the issue here. The State knew exactly what was going to happen.

THE COURT: So, why don't you pay them the \$3 million, and we'll just settle this case?

MR. HARRIS: It's not the \$3 million. It's the rental value of the EOF that should have been paid. That's what's in dispute here.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARRIS: And so, that really is the point that this was foreseeable, the State knew exactly what was going to happen. It knew it didn't have access to the EOF, but it didn't put it in the bond. That was simply a financial issue. And a year later after they'd been paying for use of the EOF, they decided, We don't want to pay anymore. We want to use our police power.

And that's exactly what happened here. The police power is not applicable because this was foreseeable, and there was no longer an emergency.

THE COURT: Can I get a little bit more background in this area? So, as I understand it, there is another pipeline that leads from the EOF to, I don't know, commercial establishments. In other words, that but for

that pipeline, which is owned by another party, Plains --09:03:53 1 09:03:56 2 MR. HARRIS: Yes, the Plains pipelines which 09:03:58 3 ruptured. Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: So, the Plains pipeline ruptured. 09:03:59 4 And then, as a result of that, the folks that are producing 09:04:01 5 09:04:06 6 the oil and gas out of the wells are in trouble --09:04:10 7 MR. HARRIS: Because --09:04:10 8 THE COURT: -- because they can't commercialize their product. 09:04:12 9 09:04:13 10 MR. HARRIS: They cannot get the gas and get to 09:04:15 11 market. Exactly right. 09:04:1612 THE COURT: So, now, did Plains try to fix the 09:04:20 13 pipeline? 09:04:20 14 MR. HARRIS: I'm not sure if they tried to fix 09:04:24 15 it. It either -- either it was not commercially reasonable 09:04:28 16 to do so or maybe they couldn't get permits to do it once 09:04:31 17 this happened, I think it may have been a permitting issue. 09:04:34 18 THE COURT: That's why --09:04:34 19 MR. HARRIS: Yeah. 09:04:35 20 THE COURT: The reason why I ask is there is 09:04:38 21 intimation in the briefing that suggests that -- makes at least a potential argument that the State created this 09:04:41 22 09:04:43 23 situation because the State precluded the continued 09:04:48 24 commercialization of the oil and gas when this rupture occurred in 2015. 09:04:53 25

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Do you want to say anything about that?

MR. HARRIS: I would have to double-check what the cause was. I know there's separate litigation pending over the Plains pipeline and its use. There's different litigation there. I think it was -- and I'm not a hundred-percent certain on the record, but I believe it was a permitting issue is why they couldn't get the Plains pipeline back operational.

So, yes, from that standpoint, I guess it would be the State that caused Venoco the problem. That once it couldn't get its oil and gas to market, then at that point they had no business ability to continue to pay for the operations. And it was a matter of going into bankruptcy was its only recourse.

THE COURT: Right. In your reply brief, you make an argument really at the outset that there's been a failure by the Bankruptcy Court and by the State to recognize that there's really two different properties here. There's the Plant Holly for the -- sorry, the Platform Holly.

MR. HARRIS: Right.

THE COURT: And the leased wells, which really are the State's property leased to Mobil and then ultimately Venoco, on one hand. And then, on the other hand, there's the EOF. And that the takings has been of the EOF, not the

Plant Holly wells property which you say, in your briefing,
Venoco had a right to quitclaim to the State.

Now, was that argument presented to the Bankruptcy Court?

MR. HARRIS: All the underlying facts were presented in that -- it's undisputed these are two separate properties. The quitclaim was for the wells and Platform Holly.

Venoco continued to hold title to the EOF. We argued -- the whole case is about the taking of the EOF, so that's undisputed. It's undisputed that the hydrogen sulfide is being produced from the wells, and that only gets to the EOF because of the pipeline connecting platform.

THE COURT: I get that the facts are there. I get that the facts are there.

MR. HARRIS: Yes.

THE COURT: It's just what I found at least the most compelling articulation of the legal arguments that flow from the facts was in the reply brief. And I'm just trying to -- I didn't see anything -- I didn't see the Bankruptcy Court address that argument in its opinion, so I'm just trying to get a better handle on it.

MR. HARRIS: The Bankruptcy Court didn't expressly address it. I believe it was raised more in the summary judgment papers at trial. The focus was really on

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the emergency aspect, but it's always dealing with two separate properties.

Where this really came up and became more prominent is in the State's brief. They cite all these nuisance cases. And they say there's no emergency required.

You don't have to have an emergency. What you do for this type of police powers exception is often called the emergency exception in California.

THE COURT: Well, also nuisance, if you take property to address a nuisance, you have to pay people; right?

MR. HARRIS: If you are taking the property on which the nuisance exists for the purpose of remedying the nuisance, that is an exception to the -- to requirement of just compensation.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARRIS: But what we're pointing out or we pointed out in our reply brief is it's always the same property. Someone creates a nuisance on their property, and you go onto that property to remedy the nuisance. That's not what happened here.

And if you look at the State's brief, in several places it talks about the nuisance or -- may not use the word "nuisance," but it talks about the harm emanating from the EOF. The harm is coming from the wells in Platform

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Holly, and the State really melds those together and argues 09:08:52 1 09:08:56 2 nuisance cases. The State cites no case in which a party has been able to come onto one property owner's property to 09:09:00 3 remedy a nuisance or problem. 09:09:05 4 THE COURT: Right. And that goes back to --09:09:06 5 this is the argument I'm talking about in the reply brief. 09:09:08 6 09:09:11 7 MR. HARRIS: Right. 09:09:11 8 THE COURT: Is it anywhere in the opinion of the Bankruptcy Court? 09:09:12 9 09:09:13 10 MR. HARRIS: It's not. The Bankruptcy Court didn't squarely address this. There are times --09:09:14 11 THE COURT: Well, did you squarely raise this to 09:09:17 12 the Bankruptcy Court without an opportunity to address it? 09:09:20 13 09:09:23 14 MR. HARRIS: All -- Your Honor, all the facts 09:09:25 15 were presented. It really was argued in terms of there 09:09:28 16 being an emergency, and the emergency focused on the two 09:09:30 17 separate properties. 09:09:31 18 THE COURT: I'm just trying to -- I mean, should 09:09:33 19 I give the Bankruptcy Court an opportunity, in the first instance, to address that? 09:09:35 20 09:09:3621 MR. HARRIS: Well, maybe so, Your Honor, just 09:09:41 22 like the Bankruptcy Court didn't address the ExxonMobil That's another issue that we could come to if the 09:09:44 23 09:09:47 24 Court would like.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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09:09:48 1	MR. HARRIS: But the Bankruptcy Court didn't
09:09:49 2	squarely tee that up and look at the fact that there were
09:09:52 3	two properties. Most of the Bankruptcy Court's opinion
09:09:54 4	deals with the emergency issue.
09:09:56 5	Turning to ExxonMobil and that point, the
09:10:00 6	Defendants here can order ExxonMobil to plug and abandon the
09:10:04 7	wells, but the Bankruptcy Court ignored this and ignored
09:10:07 8	this alternative altogether.
09:10:09 9	ExxonMobil was Venoco's predecessor in interest.
09:10:12 10	And as such, both contractually and by statute, ExxonMobil
09:10:17 11	is required to come in and plug, and abandon and
09:10:20 12	decommission if Venoco is unable to do so.
09:10:23 13	When Venoco filed for bankruptcy, the Defendants
09:10:26 1 4	preserved their rights to enforce the lease obligation.
09:10:28 15	THE COURT: And is that disputed?
09:10:32 16	MR. HARRIS: Is what part of that disputed?
09:10:33 17	THE COURT: The fact is the fact what
09:10:35 18	you've just alleged, that ExxonMobil was contractually and
09:10:41 19	statutorily obligated to plug the wells if the State
09:10:45 20	required it and Venoco was unable
09:10:45 21	MR. HARRIS: Venoco.
09:10:51 22	THE COURT: Venoco, sorry.
09:10:52 23	MR. HARRIS: It is not disputed. The Bankruptcy
09:10:54 24	Court deals with that in Footnote 51 of its opinion.
09:10:57 25	THE COURT: All right. Hold on a second.

MR. HARRIS: The footnote runs over from 09:11:03 1 09:11:06 2 Pages 1463 to 64. THE COURT: Okay. This is citing that CalGEM, 09:11:19 3 C-A-L-G-E-M Order --09:11:26 4 Hold on one second. Have you been able to hear 09:11:29 5 09:11:34 6 me? Am I too far back? 09:11:37 7 THE REPORTER: I can hear you, Your Honor. 09:11:41 8 MR. HARRIS: But to answer, Your Honor, I 09:11:42 9 believe it is undisputed --09:11:43 10 THE COURT: Okay. MR. HARRIS: -- that ExxonMobil has that 09:11:44 11 liability, both contractually and by statute. 09:11:45 12 09:11:48 13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 09:11:49 14 And anyway, the Court didn't address that. 09:11:53 15 MR. HARRIS: The Court didn't address it. 09:11:55 16 THE COURT: Right. And your point would be, 09:11:56 17 Hey, the emergency -- if there's an emergency, it's 09:12:00 18 emanating from the wells --09:12:01 19 MR. HARRIS: It's emanating --09:12:02 20 THE COURT: -- right? And there's -- the State 09:12:05 21 had the power to compel ExxonMobil to address that 09:12:10 22 emergency? 09:12:10 23 MR. HARRIS: Absolutely. And it should have 09:12:12 24 been on ExxonMobil, but instead, the State -- in saying ExxonMobil, You have this obligation in the contract, you 09:12:15 25

09:12:17 1	have this obligation under statute, you need to plug and
09:12:20 2	abandon, you need to decommission, which is going to require
09:12:23 3	use of the EOF, you need to go handle and do that, what the
09:12:26 4	State did instead was exercise, allegedly, its police power
09:12:30 5	to come in and to take the EOF without compensation.
09:12:34 6	Because this alternative was there for the State to use its
09:12:38 7	police power to instead benefit ExxonMobil, that it's
09:12:42 8	arbitrary and unreasonable and, therefore, would not be a
09:12:45 9	valid use of the State's police power.
09:12:47 10	ExxonMobil had this obligation. ExxonMobil
09:12:50 11	should have done the plugging, and abandoning and
09:12:52 12	decommissioning at its expense, rather than the State taking
09:12:57 13	property without compensation.
09:12:58 14	THE COURT: All right. And you're saying that
09:12:59 15	the Court never addressed that argument below?
09:13:01 16	MR. HARRIS: Correct.
09:13:02 17	THE COURT: Okay. You're saying you did raise
09:13:03 18	it squarely?
09:13:04 19	MR. HARRIS: Correct, Your Honor.
09:13:05 20	THE COURT: And you're saying that it's
09:13:07 21	undisputed that Exxon had this obligation?
09:13:10 22	MR. HARRIS: Correct, Your Honor.
09:13:11 23	THE COURT: And you're saying that Exxon's
09:13:13 24	obligation was a result of CalGEM, which is an Order issued
09:13:19 25	in May of 2017; is that right, by the State of California's

09:13:24 1 09:13:26 2 09:13:27 3 09:13:29 4 09:13:34 5 09:13:35 6 09:13:36 7 09:13:38 8 09:13:45 9 09:13:46 10 09:13:51 11 09:13:56 12 09:13:59 13 09:14:03 14 09:14:06 15 09:14:08 16 09:14:10 17 09:14:13 18 09:14:17 19 09:14:20 20 09:14:23 21 09:14:25 22 09:14:28 23 09:14:30 24

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Department of Conservation, Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Resources?

MR. HARRIS: I believe that Order was the Order for them to plug and abandon. The obligation arises out of the leases.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARRIS: And it arises out of the statute.

It's 3237(c) -- 3237(c) of the California Public Resources

Code.

But under the leases, it says whenever the State approved the lease assignment from ExxonMobil to Venoco, it made clear that ExxonMobil continued to have this liability, that that was expressed in the lease that if for some reason Venoco was not able to pay for the plugging and abandoning, then ExxonMobil's liable.

So, under both of those authorities, they're obligated to do it. And the plugging, and abandoning and decommissioning requires use of the EOF, which Exxon should be paying for rather than the State using its police power.

THE COURT: Now, was there any attempt by the State to reach out to ExxonMobil?

MR. HARRIS: The State in ExxonMobil entered into what's called a Phase 1 Agreement, which is in the record. There was a dispute over a couple of the wells. I think it was three of the 32 wells. ExxonMobil said, Wait a

09:14:36 1 minute. We're not operator of those wells. 09:14:38 2 This Phase 1 Agreement resolved that issue, but 09:14:42 3 in that Phase 1 Agreement the Commission reserved its rights against ExxonMobil. So, all those rights were specifically 09:14:45 4 reserved, so those rights still exist that the Commission 09:14:49 5 can require ExxonMobil to do the plugging, and abandoning 09:14:54 6 09:15:00 7 and decommissioning. 09:15:00 8 THE COURT: At its cost? At Exxon's cost? 09:15:03 9 MR. HARRIS: At Exxon's costs. Yes, Your Honor. 09:15:04 10 THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 09:15:05 11 MR. HARRIS: Unless the Court has any questions, 09:15:07 12 we request that the Court reverse the Bankruptcy Court's final judgment and remand to that Court for further 09:15:10 13 09:15:13 14 proceedings. 09:15:14 15 THE COURT: So, yeah. Let's just actually 09:15:16 16 clarify that. 09:15:16 17 So, on relief you're asking for -- your relief 09:15:19 18 is a remand? 09:15:19 19 MR. HARRIS: A remand for determination of 09:15:21 20 09:15:23 21

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damages. The police power exception should not be applicable here, in which case the Defendants are required to compensate the Trust and Trustee for the taking. And there needs to be a remand for the determination of what those damages are.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

09:15:36 1	MR. HARRIS: Thank you, Your Honor.
09:15:43 2	THE COURT: You're Mr. Rosenthal?
09:15:44 3	MR. ROSENTHAL: I am Mr. Rosenthal. And I've
09:15:47 4	appeared in front of you before, I believe.
09:15:49 5	THE COURT: Really?
09:15:51 6	MR. ROSENTHAL: In connection with the sovereign
09:15:53 7	immunity.
09:15:54 8	THE COURT: Oh, of course. Yes.
09:15:55 9	MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes. Yes, indeed.
09:15:56 10	THE COURT: Was Mr. Harris not part of that?
09:15:58 11	MR. ROSENTHAL: What?
09:15:59 12	THE COURT: The sovereign immunity?
09:16:03 13	MR. ROSENTHAL: I don't think so. Maybe.
09:16:03 14	Were you on sovereign immunity? No. No, he
09:16:08 15	wasn't.
09:16:10 16	THE COURT: Why not?
09:16:12 17	MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, Mark Dendinger from
09:16:14 18	Bracewell handled the sovereign immunity.
09:16:16 19	THE COURT: Okay. It's the same client?
09:16:17 20	MR. ROSENTHAL: Yeah, yeah.
09:16:17 21	THE COURT: I thought you meant
09:16:18 22	MR. ROSENTHAL: No, no, no.
09:16:19 23	THE COURT: just a different lawyer.
09:16:20 24	MR. ROSENTHAL: It was the same.
09:16:21 25	THE COURT: Got you.

09:16:22 1 MR. ROSENTHAL: It's the same case. 09:16:23 2 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. MR. ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Your Honor. 09:16:24 3 Again, I'm appearing for the California State 09:16:25 4 09:16:29 5 Lands Commission and for the State of California. 09:16:33 6 I have a presentation, and there's a number of arguments I 09:16:36 7 want to make. But I was the chief trial counsel and, therefore, I'm quite familiar with the facts of this case. 09:16:40 8 09:16:43 9 And I wanted to correct some factual issues on questions you 09:16:49 10 raised. Let me just deal with three of them, and then I'll get to my presentation. 09:16:53 11 09:16:54 12 Number one, you asked whether there were 09:16:56 13 conditions on the quitclaim. And you properly analyzed that 09:17:02 14 There's no condition on the quitclaim. But the issue. 09:17:05 15 obligation to plug, and abandon and leave the wells in a 09:17:11 16 final state over -- not overrode that, was an independent 09:17:17 17 obligation imposed both by the lease terms and by statute. 09:17:21 18 THE COURT: Well, if it's independent then 09:17:24 19 how -- that seems to be -- you just said it's not imposed by 09:17:28 20 the lease, it's independent. 09:17:28 21 MR. ROSENTHAL: I'm sorry. The lease -- I 09:17:34 22 misspoke. The lease does contain a provision that the 09:17:40 23 quitclaim of the leasehold has to be consistent with law. 09:17:45 24 THE COURT: Okay. 09:17:46 25 MR. ROSENTHAL: And the law requires that there

09:17:48 1	be a plug and abandonment, and that they be safely done.
09:17:54 2	And, therefore
09:17:55 3	THE COURT: So, they can't quitclaim the lease
09:17:57 4	unless it's plugged or it's rendered safe.
09:17:59 5	MR. ROSENTHAL: That is exactly right.
09:18:00 6	THE COURT: Okay.
09:18:01 7	MR. ROSENTHAL: That was an independent
09:18:02 8	obligation. It's why we could call on the bond, because
09:18:05 9	they had an independent obligation to comply with the plug
09:18:09 10	and abandonment. Because they didn't do it, we called on
09:18:13 11	the bond.
09:18:13 12	THE COURT: Right.
09:18:14 13	MR. ROSENTHAL: Okay.
09:18:15 14	THE COURT: Now, the bond is tied to the wells
09:18:19 15	and platform; right?
09:18:21 16	MR. ROSENTHAL: That's the second point I was
09:18:23 17	going to make.
09:18:24 18	The \$22 million was to pay for everything,
09:18:31 19	which, again, we don't have a final total, but I'll
09:18:37 20	represent that the number is approaching a hundred million
09:18:3921	dollars for the entire cost. Therefore
09:18:43 22	THE COURT: The entire cost of?
09:18:45 23	MR. ROSENTHAL: Plug and abandonment, and
09:18:47 24	operation of the EOF. All of the costs incurred by the
09:18:52 25	State in connection with the Ellwood Field closedown.

THE COURT: All right. So, I mean, why isn't 09:19:00 1 the problem here the State underestimated what it was going 09:19:03 2 to cost? 09:19:06 3 MR. ROSENTHAL: It was -- it is -- it is the 09:19:07 4 09:19:08 5 problem. I mean --THE COURT: Well, then why does that not fall on 09:19:09 6 09:19:11 7 the State? That doesn't mean you get to just take somebody's property. You've got to -- you know, you get a 09:19:13 8 09:19:16 9 bigger bond. 09:19:16 10 MR. ROSENTHAL: It is -- the State should have asked for more, but that did not excuse leaving a piece of 09:19:23 11 09:19:29 12 property unsafe. THE COURT: And the piece of property we're 09:19:35 13 09:19:36 14 talking about are the wells and the platform? 09:19:40 15 MR. ROSENTHAL: No, that's the point I want to 09:19:43 16 make. Venoco operated the wells as a continuous body with the EOF. It was -- they had always operated this as a 09:19:53 17 09:19:59 18 continuous body. 09:20:00 19 THE COURT: But they're different and this is --09:20:02 20 see this, I think, is your weakest argument. They haven't 09:20:04 21 really raised it, but let me raise it for you. 09:20:07 22 Let's suppose the EOF was owned by Green Energy 09:20:11 23 Company, and Venoco separately leases the wells and 09:20:1924 Platform Holly. And Green Energy Company says to you in April of 2017, We're hitting hard times. We're going to 09:20:24 25

have to shut this EOF down. We're going to have to leave it 09:20:30 1 09:20:33 2 unmanned. Although, we know of this other company that consists of our COO and other former employees of us, Green 09:20:36 3 Energy Company. You can negotiate with them a contract that 09:20:41 4 they'll continue to man the EOF. 09:20:44 5 09:20:49 6 Could you take EOF from Green Energy Company 09:20:52 7 without giving them any compensation whatsoever? 09:20:55 8 MR. ROSENTHAL: The answer is yes. 09:20:58 9 THE COURT: Really? 09:20:59 10 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yeah. 09:21:00 11 THE COURT: That's an extraordinary thing about 09:21:02 12 litigations of that --09:21:03 13 MR. ROSENTHAL: But let me explain what has 09:21:05 14 happened here and why I don't believe it's extraordinary at 09:21:10 15 all. 09:21:10 16 The fact of the matter is forget about this. 09:21:13 17 Let's assume that the gas came from the neighboring 09:21:17 18 property. If you traced all the way down, the gas came, but 09:21:22 19 it seeped into our property. Obviously --09:21:25 20 THE COURT: And what's your "property"? 09:21:27 21 MR. ROSENTHAL: I'm sorry? 09:21:28 22 THE COURT: Well, I'm lost. You say it seeps into our property. What's "our property"? 09:21:31 23 09:21:33 24 MR. ROSENTHAL: Well, I'm sorry. I should have been more articulate. 09:21:34 25

09:21:37 1 09:21:45 2 09:21:47 3 09:21:49 4 09:21:53 5 09:21:57 6 09:22:02 7 09:22:07 8 09:22:13 9 09:22:17 10 09:22:20 11 09:22:25 12 09:22:29 13 09:22:36 14 09:22:43 15 09:22:44 16 09:22:47 17 09:22:55 18 09:23:03 19 09:23:0620 09:23:11 21 09:23:12 22 09:23:15 23 09:23:22 24 09:23:28 25

If you have a piece of property from which dangerous gas is emitting.

THE COURT: Okay. Property A.

MR. ROSENTHAL: Property A. The fact that the ultimate source of the gas, if you go underground and trace it, is to a neighboring piece of property, is not relevant to the question presented, which is: Does the State have the police power to come onto property A to prevent a risk of injury to the community?

We submit, Your Honor, that the fact that the gas may have come from a neighboring piece of property, in this case, the fact that the gas came through from Platform Holly does not affect our right to come onto a piece of property to ameliorate and correct a risk emerging from that property.

THE COURT: Well, see what I'm concerned about here is that not only is the property that is being taken not property A, but the taker of the property is the owner of property A.

The State is the owner of the wells in Platform Holly; correct?

MR. ROSENTHAL: We own it, but -- and here's the critical point, Your Honor, which -- the fact is that Venoco always operated the EOF and our property as a unified whole.

THE COURT: But you say that I agree that that

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is the factual history here, but I don't know why that's relevant to the legal question, especially when the State -- because then I think you need to -- well, that's what I'm trying to figure out because --

MR. ROSENTHAL: Well --

THE COURT: -- for instance, I'd like you to really -- you know, that's why I gave you the hypo.

MR. ROSENTHAL: Right.

actually have the State take from Green Energy Company, which played no role in the operation of the wells, had no obligations with respect to the operation of the wells, but you're saying to remedy the dangerous condition which is created by the wells, because it's the wells that emanate or emit, I guess -- whatever the right word is -- the H₂S, the EOF is the remedy to that.

Let me give you this. Suppose we had a nuclear power plant and the nuclear power plant all of a sudden cracks. And the Government, to address that dangerous situation, needs to employ the one company in the country that has the ability to address that situation. But that company doesn't have any relation at all directly to the nuclear power plant.

And under your theory, the Government could come in and it could compel, take over that third-party

09:25:07 1	engineering company in order to remedy the nuclear power
09:25:12 2	plant problem even though it had nothing to do with creating
09:25:15 3	the problem?
09:25:16 4	MR. ROSENTHAL: No, Your Honor. We don't
09:25:18 5	subscribe to that position. And we and with all due
09:25:21 6	respect, that's not this case. What we're talking about
09:25:25 7	here is and this is coming onto a piece of property. The
09:25:32 8	basic facts are not in dispute. The $\mathrm{H_2S}$ is coming off the
09:25:37 9	EOF. The dangerous gas is coming
09:25:42 10	THE COURT: Well, it's coming off? It's
09:25:46 11	actually it's I thought the ${ m H_2S}$
09:25:47 12	MR. ROSENTHAL: Well
09:25:48 13	THE COURT: gets from the wells and Platform
09:25:50 14	Holly to the EOF where the EOF does chemical reactions to
09:25:56 15	MR. ROSENTHAL: That's exactly
09:25:58 16	THE COURT: render the $\mathrm{H_2S}$ safe.
09:26:00 17	MR. ROSENTHAL: That's correct.
09:26:00 18	THE COURT: Okay.
09:26:01 19	MR. ROSENTHAL: And in the absence of the
09:26:03 20	control mechanisms on the EOF, the $\mathrm{H_2S}$ untreated would go
09:26:10 21	into the general environment.
09:26:12 22	THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this: How does
09:26:14 23	the the $\mathrm{H_2}\mathrm{S}$ is in the boiled in the gas that comes out
09:26:18 24	of the wells at Platform Holly; is that right?
09:26:20 25	MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes. Yes.

THE COURT: What if the EOF just shut down the 09:26:21 1 09:26:24 2 pipeline from Platform Holly, what would happen? MR. ROSENTHAL: The --09:26:27 3 THE COURT: So, it doesn't accept anything 09:26:29 4 anymore. EOF just says, We're not taking any oil. 09:26:31 5 09:26:34 6 MR. ROSENTHAL: Which it cannot lawfully do. 09:26:36 7 THE COURT: Okay. 09:26:37 8 MR. ROSENTHAL: I mean, the law, the Clean Air 09:26:42 9 Act permit and the other permits require, as a matter of law, that the EOF treat the H₂S. It isn't as if the State 09:26:46 10 could have cut the line without people going to jail. 09:26:57 11 09:27:03 12 operation was unified as -- under a Clean Air Act permit and was a requirement. 09:27:07 13 09:27:09 14 So, this is the point I'm trying to make, Your 09:27:13 15 Honor. And that is, we came on to deal with what we viewed 09:27:20 16 as an exigent circumstance about the problem at the EOF. 09:27:28 17 And those gases may have had an ultimate source elsewhere, 09:27:35 18 but there was nothing we could do, that the State could do 09:27:40 19 to prevent that gas from going from the wells through 09:27:44 20 Platform Holly to the EOF. 09:27:47 21 THE COURT: Let me stop you there. Why couldn't you have forced ExxonMobil to plug the well? 09:27:49 22 09:27:51 23 MR. ROSENTHAL: Ah, I'll deal with the 09:27:54 24 ExxonMobil. And --THE COURT: And before you do, because -- let me 09:27:59 25

just --09:28:01 1 09:28:01 2 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yeah, I wanted to resolve this issue first and then get to ExxonMobil. 09:28:04 3 THE COURT: No. You know, that's one of the --09:28:06 4 MR. ROSENTHAL: No. No. That's your 09:28:08 5 prerogative. 09:28:10 6 09:28:11 7 THE COURT: Yeah. I'm, unfortunately, the one who has to decide the case. 09:28:12 8 09:28:12 9 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes, Your Honor. 09:28:14 10 THE COURT: So, you, unfortunately, have to go with my questions, if you don't mind. 09:28:16 11 09:28:17 12 MR. ROSENTHAL: Absolutely. THE COURT: And let the record reflect I'm not 09:28:18 13 yelling or raising my voice in any way to make that point. 09:28:20 14 09:28:26 15 The --09:28:30 16 MR. ROSENTHAL: Do you want me to deal with 09:28:31 17 ExxonMobil? THE COURT: Let me ask a finer point question. 09:28:32 18 09:28:37 19 You agree that but for the operation of the wells in 09:28:45 20 Platform Holly, there would be no H,S to deal with at the EOF; correct? 09:28:49 21 09:28:51 22 MR. ROSENTHAL: That's correct. If --09:28:52 23 THE COURT: So, if someone plugged the wells, 09:28:57 24 there would be no need for the State to man, either by taking or otherwise the EOF; correct? 09:29:06 25

09:29:09 1 MR. ROSENTHAL: That's correct.

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THE COURT: All right. Now, go ahead.

MR. ROSENTHAL: Okay. The problem with -- first of all -- and this is, I think, a critical point. The argument that they presented to this Court about ExxonMobil was not -- and I underscore -- not presented to the Bankruptcy Court. And the reason it did not deal with this issue, they didn't -- did not make the contention they're making today which is that ExxonMobil should have -- well, their argument is that ExxonMobil should have come onto the EOF and operated the EOF.

They never called an ExxonMobil witness. They never deposed an ExxonMobil witness. They never dealt with the issue as a factual matter in the Trial Court. As a result, the issue was never properly posed to the judge.

What is in the record, Your Honor, is simply the Settlement Agreement that was entered into between the State and ExxonMobil.

It is correct, Your Honor, that ExxonMobil had an underlying obligation to plug and abandon some portion of the wells that were abandoned. There was a dispute between the State and ExxonMobil about the extent of that obligation. And as a result, a Settlement Agreement was entered into in which ExxonMobil, as a contractor to the State, undertook the plug and abandonment.

09:31:05 1	But let me tell you, that argument, that focus
09:31:08 2	on plugged and abandonment doesn't get my opponents, the
09:31:13 3	Trustee, to the promised land because whatever was
09:31:17 4	ExxonMobil's obligation to plug and abandon did not require
09:31:22 5	them to go onto the EOF. And we, the State, had no power to
09:31:29 6	require them to operate the EOF. And, therefore, even if we
09:31:36 7	could have and should have forced them to do the plug and
09:31:41 8	abandonment, Exxon was not going to go onto the EOF. It
09:31:46 9	was
09:31:46 10	THE COURT: Well, that seems to me to suggest,
09:31:51 11	at most, that for the time between for the time it would
09:31:59 12	have taken Exxon to plug the well, you might have a takings
09:32:03 13	argument.
09:32:04 14	MR. ROSENTHAL: Right.
09:32:05 15	THE COURT: But since you didn't at all compel
09:32:08 16	Exxon to do what I think you admit it had an obligation to
09:32:12 17	do, if you didn't ask it to, I don't know how you can argue
09:32:16 18	that it's a justified takings for whatever period of time,
09:32:22 19	you know, it
09:32:28 20	MR. ROSENTHAL: I honestly am not following,
09:32:30 21	Your Honor.
09:32:30 22	THE COURT: Yeah. That's fair. I mean, it
09:32:32 23	was
09:32:32 24	MR. ROSENTHAL: The time they were plugging and
09:32:34 25	abandonment and abandoning, they someone needed to

09:32:38 1 operate the EOF. The --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSENTHAL: The weakness of their position is there was no way to force ExxonMobil. First of all, there's no evidence in the record on this issue, but -- because no one ever asked ExxonMobil would they have done it.

But, as a logical matter, there was no statutory legal argument that we could have imposed on ExxonMobil that could have required them to set foot on the EOF. And I assure you, Your Honor, they never would have set foot because once they did, they would have liabilities and legal obligations that a sophisticated company like ExxonMobil was never going to do.

THE COURT: Yeah, but I think it's a given that if they are obligated to plug and -- plug the wells, they must have the ability to have access to the EOF to treat the ${\rm H}_2{\rm S}$.

MR. ROSENTHAL: No. That's the point.

THE COURT: Well, how could you plug the wells without addressing the H₂S problem?

MR. ROSENTHAL: They would be willing to plug and abandon, but they would have turned around to the State and said, You're going to have to facilitate that by going onto the EOF and doing exactly what we were going to do.

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Absent a lawsuit, which would have taken ten years, there never was going to be ExxonMobil going onto the TNA and going to the EOF.

At most, all we could say is, Plug and abandon. They would have said, Fine, we need the EOF. You, the State, need to provide us with the EOF. You have to facilitate that.

THE COURT: Okay. See, I need to stop you because this is where I do feel like -- I think this all could be answered as a legal matter by looking at whatever contracts or regulations govern this, but to me it seems pretty important because they're suggesting -- this is like an undisputed area of -- before me or a question, rather, and I think it's undisputed.

You both agree that Exxon could be compelled by the State to plug the well; correct?

MR. ROSENTHAL: Some -- to some extent.

THE COURT: All right. Right. And the "some extent," the reason why you add those words is because your point is that you could not compel Exxon to pay for or use of the EOF or to somehow address the H,S issue; is that right?

MR. ROSENTHAL: That's one reason, but it's not the only reason.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. ROSENTHAL: But the fact is that when we went to Exxon, Exxon did dispute how many wells were covered. And we were going to buy basically a lawsuit if we were going to compel them to clean up, do all the plug and abandonment, which is why there was a Settlement Agreement in which they agreed to do X and Y.

Now, let me point out one very important aspect of the Settlement Agreement which may help the Court. The Settlement Agreement does mention the EOF. And it is very clear in the terms of the EOF -- and we can provide the cite -- that the EOF is not the subject of the Settlement Agreement. Exxon was very clear in negotiating the Settlement Agreement that it hadn't -- it did not want to have anything to do with the EOF, and it is expressly excepted from the terms of the Settlement Agreement. And we'll provide you the page, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is the obligation on Exxon's part to plug the well or to safely plug the well?

MR. ROSENTHAL: Well, plug and abandonment includes a concept of safely closing it down as a permanent matter.

THE COURT: So, then why -- if that's the obligation Exxon had, why doesn't that cover use of the EOF?

MR. ROSENTHAL: Because we could not compel them

to set foot -- the plug and abandon --

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THE COURT: You could compel them to safely plug the well. That means that they have to come up with a way to do it. And if the only way to do it is to make use of the EOF, it seems that's a legal obligation on Exxon's part.

MR. ROSENTHAL: But the -- Your Honor, we would certainly have had a ten-year lawsuit on that issue. Their position would be safely plug and abandonment requires that we put in the concrete properly, that we do all the actions out at sea on our leasehold to make this -- make it appropriate, make an appropriate closure. Their position would absolutely, Your Honor, have been that we have no obligation to go to the EOF. They would have turned around and said, If you're going --

THE COURT: You might have had to fight that battle, but it sounded like --

MR. ROSENTHAL: But --

THE COURT: -- you conceded that Exxon had a legal obligation to safely plug the wells. You've conceded that, ultimately, the $\rm H_2S$ safety threat emanates from the wells. You've said the only way to address that safety threat is through the operation of the EOF. It seems to me it just follows as a syllogism that as a logic -- logic syllogism that --

MR. ROSENTHAL: But --

THE COURT: -- Exxon then could be compelled to

make use of the EOF.

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MR. ROSENTHAL: I can't disagree more, Your

Honor. I don't think the syllogism -- their position will

be -- safely plugging and abandonment will be limited to the

operation to the activities that occur on our leasehold. If

there needs to be support for that proposition, the State

will need to -- if the EOF is needed for us to do that, it's

like any other support activity.

But let me go to the more fundamental issue. We still were faced with a problem on -- in April of 2017, in which we had to deal with a situation in which there was gas coming out of -- the potential for gas coming out of the EOF. I mean, at most -- at very most what you're describing is a situation in which the State would have compelled -- might have compelled Exxon, after five years of litigation, to do a plug and abandonment. But that did not represent -- and this is a point that the trial -- that the Bankruptcy Court consistently made. We needed a solution today. We needed a solution that --

THE COURT: What's the "today"? What date is "today"?

MR. ROSENTHAL: As of April of 2017.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSENTHAL: And the fact that we might have some alternative, and two were expressly discussed by

09:40:18 1 the other side. A platform -- a boat that would be there or 09:40:24 2 running a line ten miles to another location. 09:40:28 3 Any of these alternatives would have required years to implement. And what you're describing, the 09:40:32 4 ExxonMobil alternative, is an alternative that there is no 09:40:37 5 evidence could have been implemented in April of 2017. So, 09:40:42 6 09:40:48 7 whatever our legal rights were, and even if you entertain the assumption that that legal right somehow could have 09:40:53 8 09:40:56 9 compelled them to go to the EOF, it didn't -- there's no evidence in this record that that was an alternative. 09:41:00 10 THE COURT: Well, there's evidence that you pay 09:41:05 11 09:41:08 12 for use of the EOF; right? 09:41:11 13 MR. ROSENTHAL: As an attempt to try to settle 09:41:14 14 this matter for a limited period of time. 09:41:17 15 THE COURT: Wait, wait. You're saying it's a 09:41:19 16 Rule 408 issue. This is a settlement. 09:41:20 17 MR. ROSENTHAL: No, no, no. 09:41:21 18 THE COURT: So, you -- it's undisputed --09:41:22 19 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yeah. 09:41:23 20 THE COURT: -- that you paid for it. 09:41:24 21 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yeah, for a period of time. 09:41:25 22 THE COURT: Right. And so it's undisputed -- it 09:41:27 23 could be paid for. So, why isn't there enough in the record 09:41:30 24 to say that, Well, Exxon could have paid for it and could

have been required to pay for it?

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09:41:36 1 MR. ROSENTHAL: Well --09:41:37 2 THE COURT: And, in fact, you can kind of -- I think you could even say there's record evidence of what 09:41:38 3 they would have had to pay. 09:41:41 4 MR. ROSENTHAL: No, Your Honor. You've gone 09:41:42 5 from could have to should have. The fact of the matter is 09:41:45 6 09:41:49 7 there was no evidence in the record. Someone had to operate the EOF. But there's no evidence that we could have 09:41:53 8 09:41:57 9 compelled or that Exxon would have been willing to operate 09:42:02 10 the EOF. THE COURT: Well, wait. You just said --09:42:04 11 09:42:06 12 MR. ROSENTHAL: I'm not trying to contradict 09:42:08 13 myself. 09:42:09 14 THE COURT: You just said that you agree that 09:42:15 15 Exxon had a legal obligation to safely plug the wells. 09:42:18 16 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes. 09:42:19 17 THE COURT: Okay. So, it seems to me, and maybe 09:42:23 18 we can get something on briefing on it if you want, but 09:42:27 19 there's a legal argument, at least, that that would -- that obligation would necessarily require compensation to the 09:42:31 20 09:42:37 21 operator of the EOF by Exxon. 09:42:41 22 MR. ROSENTHAL: I don't see that connection. 09:42:44 23 THE COURT: Well, you --09:42:44 24 MR. ROSENTHAL: I -- the fact that --THE COURT: It's a given fact that the wells can 09:42:45 25

only be operated and can only be plugged safely if they have access to the EOF.

MR. ROSENTHAL: No, that someone had access.

I'm -- there would have been a dispute, Your Honor. I mean,
there would have been a dispute whether safely closing those
wells would have required ExxonMobil to have to pay and go
onto the EOF. Their position would have been that it
doesn't entail that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I guess the position -- I guess the question is: Did the State not at least contribute to the emergency by not seeking to get Exxon to fulfill that contractual obligation?

MR. ROSENTHAL: No, Your Honor. Because they —
the emergency would have existed even if we turned around
and demanded ExxonMobil start cleaning up the wells
immediately. This emergency would have existed
independently because the gas would still have been coming
to the EOF and emerging from the site.

Your Honor, I see I haven't satisfied you on this issue.

To us -- first of all, the argument that they present in their reply brief about the fact that the gas came ultimately from the wells was also an argument they did not present to the Trial Court judge.

THE COURT: I think it's in the Trial Court's

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opinion that the gas --

MR. ROSENTHAL: No, no, no.

THE COURT: -- problem emanates from the wells.

MR. ROSENTHAL: The -- I'm talking about the legal argument, which is the argument that as a result there was -- they -- there was -- we should not be legally entitled to have come onto the property because the gas ultimately came --

THE COURT: I don't know that there's an argument that you're not legally entitled to come onto the property. I think it's that if you do come onto the property, you have to pay them; right?

MR. ROSENTHAL: That is the legal argument.

THE COURT: That's a huge distinction. I don't think anybody here in this room, and please stand up if you disagree, argues that the State doesn't have the power to come and address a situation like this.

I think the only argument is whether you get to do it for free at the cost of the Trustee.

MR. ROSENTHAL: And can I go back to the principle argument, which was what I was going to make, and that is, although certainly an emergency is a justification, the legal concept here is broader, Your Honor.

The takings clause does not cover the State coming onto property to ameliorate a risk to public health,

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safety or the environment. It does not -- there are all of these little cubbyholes that the Trustee wants to create: nuisance, emergency, necessity. The doctrine is broader than that. And the proof of that --

THE COURT: "The doctrine" being? What's "the doctrine"?

MR. ROSENTHAL: The doctrine that the State may enter onto private property to remedy a risk to public health, safety or the environment. And that entering the property and remaining on the property until the hazard is resolved does not constitute a taking of property for which compensation is owed. That is the legal proposition that we believe the Supreme Court of the United States, we believe the Supreme Court of California, both have held that to be the case.

There does not -- an emergency certainly is a subgroup of that, but there does not need to be an emergency. There does not have to be a -- an exigency that requires imminent and immediate harm for the State to come onto the property.

And I'll give you a huge example of that because it comes from their brief. Under the Superfund Statute, the administrator of the EPA is entitled by law to come onto property to remove pollutants and chemicals on the property. He doesn't have to prove there's an emergency, he just has

09:47:42 1	to prove that there's that these chemicals are on the
09:47:46 2	property and are not being properly handled by the owner of
09:47:50 3	the property. And there are dozens of those cases.
09:47:54 4	Congress can't create an exception to the
09:47:58 5	takings clause. Every one of those EPA cases under CERCLA
09:48:04 6	where EPA comes onto private property to get rid of
09:48:09 7	dangerous chemicals is an example of the Federal
09:48:14 8	Government's exercising of police power.
09:48:16 9	THE COURT: It might be the exercise of police
09:48:18 10	power, but tell me: Where does it say that they get to do
09:48:21 11	it for free?
09:48:22 12	MR. ROSENTHAL: All those cases I mean, there
09:48:24 13	are numerous cases in which EPA comes on. EPA, when they
09:48:29 14	exercise their CERCLA power, do not pay just compensation.
09:48:35 15	And
09:48:35 16	THE COURT: They don't pay any compensation at
09:48:37 17	all?
09:48:38 18	MR. ROSENTHAL: They do not.
09:48:38 19	THE COURT: And these cases are in the briefing?
09:48:41 20	MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes. Our cases are in the
09:48:43 21	briefing.
09:48:43 22	Let me give you two Supreme examples of that.
09:48:47 23	The Supreme Court and and I I note, Your Honor I
09:48:51 24	know Your Honor has questioned this.

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In Cedar Point Nursery, which is the most recent

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exposition of takings law by the Supreme Court, at the end of the opinion, the Supreme Court said, Our holding here does not affect background property law principles. And one of those principles, and I'm quoting, is "to enter property in the event of public or private necessity," which means, and I'm quoting now, "entry to overt serious harm to person, land or chattel"; that's at 141 Supreme Court 2079.

Where the Government comes onto property to overt harm to people, land, even chattels, is a background legal principle that entitles the Government to come onto property and avoid and -- without having to engage in just compensation, without -- it doesn't even constitute a taking where the Government comes onto property.

And in this case, Your Honor, and I need to bring you back to this case. We -- as Your Honor said, we -- we -- no one is disputing our right to come onto the property. If there was a risk of harm to persons, property, environment, and we were -- we reasonably believed that to be the case, our coming onto the property and our remaining on the property until the emergency ceased was an exercise of our police power. And the Bankruptcy Court got it exactly right when it said that that's a paradigmatic example of the exercise of the police power for which no compensation is owed.

Let me quote one other case, which is the

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Customer Company case from the California Supreme Court which said the -- said basically the same thing. It talked about, and I'm quoting now, "The so-called emergency exception to the compensation requirement." It described that, and let me quote the words. This is, "a specific application of the general rule that damage to or even destruction of property, pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power, often requires no compensation under the just compensation clause."

Basically the emergency exception, the necessity exception, nuisance, these are all subgroups of a general principle. And we submit that what we did here was an exercise of our police power, exactly what the Bankruptcy Court held. And as a result of that exercise, no just compensation is owed.

If I can, I want to explain a little bit why the cases they cite about necessity and unforeseeability really are beside the point. The cases they cite, which are California cases, if you review all of them, with one exception, they are all public works cases.

Under California law, basically if the State is engaged in the planning, the construction, or the operation of a public work, the State is responsible for any damage resulting therefrom. All of these cases, *Oroville*, *Odello Brothers*, *House*, et cetera, Your Honor, are all examples of

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public works. And what the State is trying to do is avoid compensation because they said it wasn't really the public work that did it, we had an emergency that caused the damage.

None of those cases, with one exception, deals with this circumstance which is coming onto property to remedy a danger of public health safety or the environment.

Only one of the cases deals with that issue, and that's the City of Rose case.

And in that case, the Court held there was a factual dispute as to whether the emergency existed -- they call it emergency -- but whether the hazard existed at all because it was substantial testimony. This was a demolition case and the Court held -- and the Court held -- there was a dispute as to whether there was any danger posed by the building at all. So, it went to the underlining existence.

So, I want to bring the Court back to the basic holding here of the Trial Court -- of the Bankruptcy Court, which is we had a circumstance. We think there was an emergency, but it didn't need to be. What it needed to be was a risk to public health, safety or the environment. And if that was true, and I think it is hard to contend it was not true, then we had the right to enter the property.

And we submit, Your Honor, if you look through the case law, that in that circumstance there is no duty to

09:54:52 1	pay compensation if we are exercising our police power to
09:54:56 2	come onto the property. And we cite enumerable cases for
09:55:02 3	that proposition.
09:55:05 4	THE COURT: All right. Anything else?
09:55:09 5	MR. ROSENTHAL: Not unless Your Honor has some
09:55:12 6	questions.
09:55:13 7	THE COURT: No. Thanks.
09:55:18 8	MR. HARRIS: Would the Court like to hear
09:55:20 9	rebuttal?
09:55:20 10	THE COURT: If you have any rebuttal points to
09:55:22 11	make.
09:55:22 12	MR. HARRIS: Yes. I have three points, Your
09:55:24 13	Honor, and I'll be very brief.
09:55:25 14	First, on the CalGEM Order that we discussed,
09:55:31 15	CalGEM did not order ExxonMobil to do the plugging and
09:55:35 16	abandoning. CalGEM wrote a letter to ExxonMobil reminding
09:55:39 17	them of their obligation that if Venoco was not able to do
09:55:42 18	it, then they would be liable. And that's in the record at
09:55:46 19	Page 1398.
09:55:47 20	The letter that's referenced in the footnote
09:55:51 21	that we were looking at in the Bankruptcy Court's opinion is
09:55:54 22	a reference to the letter that CalGEM wrote to Venoco to
09:55:58 23	plug and abandon. I just wanted to clarify that. I think I
09:56:0224	may have misspoken on that.

On the ExxonMobil issue, this issue was

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presented to the Bankruptcy Court. The Trustee presented evidence that ExxonMobil was the immediately preceding operator. That's on Page 864 of the record, and it's recognized in the footnote that we were discussing earlier, Footnote 516, the Bankruptcy Court's opinion.

The Trustee presented evidence that Venoco was finally unable to cover the cost of plugging and abandoning. And that's all that the Trustee had to show to demonstrate that ExxonMobil's obligated to plug and abandon under the California Public Resources Code as well as the lease.

The Trustee presented evidence that the

Commission reserved its rights against ExxonMobil in the

Phase 1 Agreement. And making that clear, the Bankruptcy

Court found that ExxonMobil was obligated to plug and

abandon, and that the EOF was necessary. And, again, that's

in the footnote that we've referenced earlier.

On Your Honor's point about ExxonMobil requiring -- being required to use the EOF, that's exactly right. As the Bankruptcy Court stated in its opinion, "But here the operation of EOF is not simply convenient, it is necessary."

And if ExxonMobil was going to safely plug and abandon, it was required to use the EOF, and it would be required to pay the Trust for doing that. The Phase 1

Agreement does say that the EOF is outside of the scope of

09:57:29 1 09:57:33 2 09:57:37 3 09:57:39 4 09:57:43 5 09:57:47 6 09:57:51 7 enforce its rights against ExxonMobil. 09:57:53 8 09:57:56 9 09:57:59 10 09:58:04 11 09:58:09 12 distinguishable from this case. 09:58:13 13 09:58:14 14 09:58:16 15 material on the EOF; right? 09:58:18 16 09:58:20 17 09:58:24 18 09:58:27 19 09:58:30 20 the property. 09:58:31 21 09:58:35 22 to address the H₂S situation; right? 09:58:45 23 09:58:48 24 09:58:50 25

that agreement. But the State simply by coming into this Court and saying, But Exxon wouldn't have done that, we would have been in litigation. The State has lawyers. And if ExxonMobil won't comply with its obligations, the State should have enforced that. The State doesn't have the right to come in and take property because it chooses not to And the final point I'll make on the CERCLA cases that were addressed, all of those cases is where the Government is entering property where the hazardous material is on that property. And those are discussed in our reply brief on Page 19 in Note 4. So, those are all

THE COURT: Okay. But there is hazardous

MR. HARRIS: It's because it's the State's wells that are moving the hazardous material there, which is very different than the CERCLA situation where the owner of the property has hazardous material that it has caused to be on

THE COURT: But under the permit to operate the EOF, Venoco was required to process the incoming oil and gas

MR. HARRIS: I'm not sure about the permits, Your Honor.

09:58:51 1 THE COURT: Isn't that the whole purpose of the 09:58:55 2 EOF? MR. HARRIS: It is. I mean, it was designed to 09:58:55 3 work with the -- to work with Platform Holly and the wells 09:58:57 4 to process and to remove the hydrogen sulfide. But, again, 09:59:01 5 09:59:06 6 when the State went into this, and the State under the 09:59:10 7 leases and the State, whenever it knew that it might be obligated to step in if these wells were quitclaimed back, 09:59:14 8 09:59:19 9 knew that the EOF was going to be required. And it should have required that in the bond or should have required 09:59:21 10 ExxonMobil to come in and do that cleanup. 09:59:24 11 09:59:26 12 It didn't do that. The State made the decision not to put the cost of the EOF in the bond. Ms. Lucchesi 09:59:30 13 testified, Yeah, we should have negotiated for a higher bond 09:59:34 14 09:59:36 15 and didn't. That cost can't be shifted because the State 09:59:40 16 doesn't want to pay for it or, more importantly, doesn't 09:59:42 17 want to have ExxonMobil pay for it. 09:59:45 18 THE COURT: Just give me a second. 10:01:09 19 Thank you very much. Okay. 10:01:10 20 MR. HARRIS: Thanks, Your Honor. 10:01:11 21 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 10:01:13 22 It's going to take me a while to think through There's a lot of complexity to the issues. I 10:01:1623 this. 10:01:21 24 appreciate the argument.

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And, oh, I know what I wanted -- I did want to

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ask you both. Has the plugging been completed?

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10:01:33 3 opposing -- the Trustee that we will be off the property by

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the end of May. The good news is the H,S releases were

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ended very recently, but we have to do cleanup on the site

MR. ROSENTHAL: The -- we have notified the

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to remove H₂S from the site. But all of that will be done

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by the end of May, and we will be off the property at that

point. 10:02:00 8

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

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And then -- you all can be seated. And then

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what's the status of the bankruptcy overall? Is this the

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only thing left to be adjudicated?

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MR. DENDINGER: Good morning, Your Honor.

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Dendinger from Bracewell, counsel to the Trustee handling

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the bankruptcy. The bankruptcy has been substantially

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concluded.

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10:02:32 18 Iron Mountain. It's a data storage claim. Frankly, it

relates to the records related to this litigation as well as

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another piece of litigation that Bracewell is not handling

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for the Trustee.

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So, there's this litigation, litigation related

There's one claim that remains open. It's by

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to the Plains All-American pipeline rupture that Your Honor

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referenced earlier and then one claim that we're aware of

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that's active for a reason --

10:02:54 1 THE COURT: Wait. Tell me about the rupture. 10:02:55 2 So, there is litigation still pending about the rupture, the 2015 rupture? 10:02:58 3 MR. DENDINGER: There is. Yes, Your Honor. 10:03:00 4 THE COURT: What's going on with that? 10:03:01 5 MR. DENDINGER: Again, counsel from -- Bracewell 10:03:03 6 10:03:05 7 is not handling that litigation, Your Honor, so I have to be a little bit careful about it, I suppose. But that is 10:03:08 8 10:03:12 9 litigation that's been ongoing since the May 2015 rupture. It's related to the shut-in of Platform Holly. And 10:03:18 10 essentially the -- you know, the shut-in of the entirety of 10:03:22 11 10:03:25 12 the company's production that kick-started the bankruptcy 10:03:29 13 process, both bankruptcies. THE COURT: So, it's probably worth a lot 10:03:31 14 10:03:33 15 potentially? 10:03:34 16 MR. DENDINGER: In our mind, it's worth a lot, 10:03:36 17 yes, Your Honor. 10:03:37 18 THE COURT: And I'm actually -- one other 10:03:39 19 followup with the State. Let me ask you: Did the State --10:03:47 20 there's an intimation in the brief that the State would not 10:03:50 21 allow for kind of an alternative to the Plain pipeline. 10:03:55 22 MR. ROSENTHAL: Oh, that has nothing to do with 10:03:57 23 the California State Lands Commission. 10:04:00 24 THE COURT: What about the State? The State is in it, too; right? 10:04:03 25

MR. ROSENTHAL: Well, I mean, applications were 10:04:04 1 10:04:05 2 made. I'm not sure -- there was an -- there was some proposal made for the pipeline to be reconstructed, but I 10:04:13 3 have to confess, Your Honor, I don't know the details of 10:04:19 4 that, what happened or what block or if there was even a 10:04:23 5 blocking of the pipeline. I just don't know, Your Honor. 10:04:34 6 10:04:38 7 THE COURT: Okay. All right. All right. Thank you all. Have a good day. 10:04:39 8 10:04:43 9 MR. HARRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. (Court was recessed at 10:04 a.m.) 10 I hereby certify the foregoing is a true and 11 12 accurate transcript from my stenographic notes in the 13 proceeding. 14 /s/ Heather M. Triozzi Certified Merit and Real-Time Reporter 15 U.S. District Court 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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